ADR 0043 — Electron Git runtime hardening
Accepted · 2026-11-07
Extends the renderer-compromise threat model of ADR 0004 and ADR 0026 to the desktop Git integration.
Context
Section titled “Context”The desktop Git dialog runs the user’s installed git from Electron main (runGit in electron/main/handlers/git-runtime.ts) inside registered OpenCollection directories. Git reads repo-local config (.git/config) and hook scripts (.git/hooks/*), and several config keys name programs Git executes: hooks, core.fsmonitor, core.sshCommand, diff.external, and filter / merge / textconv drivers.
Two things make that a code-execution path:
- Collection repos are untrusted. A user clones a collection someone else wrote. A bare repository embedded in the working tree, or config shipped alongside it, must not be able to run a program when Restura runs
status,difforcommit. - The renderer could write into
.git/. The renderer file API (electron/main/storage/file-operations.ts) allows reads and writes under registered collection directories. A compromised renderer (XSS in a response viewer, a malicious import) could write a.git/configfilter driver or a hook, then trigger a Git operation and have main execute it — a renderer-to-main escape.
runGit already stripped GIT_* environment variables and emptied core.fsmonitor and core.sshCommand; hooks and diff.external were still honoured.
Decision
Section titled “Decision”- Command-line overrides on every Git call.
GIT_HARDENING_ARGSprefixes each command with-csettings, which take precedence over every config file:core.hooksPath=<null device>(/dev/null,NULon Windows) — no repo hook runs;diff.external=— no external diff program;core.fsmonitor=andcore.sshCommand=— kept from before;safe.bareRepository=explicit— Git ignores a bare repository it discovers in the tree.
- No renderer access to Git metadata.
isPathSafeandisPathRealSaferefuse any path with a.gitcomponent, for reads and writes (hasGitMetadataSegment). NTFS aliases (trailing dots/spaces, 8.3 names such asGIT~1) and symlinks that resolve into a.gitdirectory are refused too. Reads are refused because.git/configcan embed remote credentials. This covers the drivers that-ccannot blanket-disable (their names are arbitrary). - Signing configuration (
commit.gpgSign,gpg.program) is not overridden; signed commits keep working.
Alternatives considered
Section titled “Alternatives considered”- Allowlist known-safe hooks. Rejected: a hook is an arbitrary script, and whether it is “safe” depends on its contents, which the attacker controls. There is no allowlist that keeps husky working and blocks a planted
pre-commit. - Per-repo trust prompt (run hooks after the user trusts the repo, like an editor’s workspace trust). Rejected for now: the renderer-write path means a trusted repo can still be modified by a compromised renderer after the prompt, and the prompt UI would itself need to live outside the renderer. Could be revisited once
.git/writes are impossible from the renderer, which this ADR provides. GIT_CONFIG_*environment variables (GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/GIT_CONFIG_KEY_n/GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_n). Equivalent precedence to-c, butrunGitdeliberately strips everyGIT_*variable inherited from the environment; mixing in some set by Restura makes that filter harder to audit.-carguments are visible in the argv and in tests.
Consequences
Section titled “Consequences”Positive
- A cloned repo or a compromised renderer can no longer get main to run a hook or external diff through Restura’s Git dialog.
- The renderer cannot read
.git/configcredentials or plant config.
Negative
- User hooks (husky, commitlint, lint-staged,
post-mergeinstallers) do not run for commits, merges or pulls made in Restura. Users who rely on them commit from a terminal. Collections says so. - Filter / merge / textconv drivers configured by the user in the repo still run (they cannot be blanket-disabled); the protection is that the renderer cannot write them.
- A collection that the user intentionally keeps inside a bare repository needs an explicit
--git-dir, which Restura does not pass.
References
Section titled “References”- Code:
electron/main/handlers/git-runtime.ts(GIT_HARDENING_ARGS,runGit),electron/main/storage/file-operations.ts(hasGitMetadataSegment,isPathSafe,isPathRealSafe) - Tests:
electron/main/__tests__/git-runtime-hardening.test.ts,electron/main/__tests__/file-operations.test.ts - Related: ADR 0004, ADR 0026